Exploring the Perceptual World

Livia Marly Sa
Graduate student, College of Education
Department of Curriculum and Instruction
University of Nevada, Reno
E-mail: liviasa@unr.edu

If the Creator were to bestow a new set of senses upon us,
or slightly remodel the present ones,
leaving all the rest of nature unchanged,
we should never doubt we were in another world,
and so in strict reality we should be,
just as if all the world besides our senses were changed.

--John Muir [1]

Teachers do not have the power to bestow a new set of senses upon students, but they can certainly stimulate the five senses that most of us are born with. Our genetic make up allows us to sense five different worlds, namely, the auditory, the visual, the tactile, the olfactory, and the gustatory world (Solso, 2001). What is not written on our DNA, though, is the amount and type of value that the information processed by our sensory system will have on our mind. It is the mind that interprets the signals from the physical world that are captured by our senses, but it is socialization that informs the mind which sensory signals to interpret and how to interpret them. That being the case, we would then be living in three distinct and interactive worlds: the empirical, physical world, which is infinite and goes beyond what our senses can possibly capture; the sensory world, which is the world within the realm of our physical make up; and the perceptual world, which is conceived by our minds and informed by socialization (Figure 1).

This article argues that in order to create a more humane society, instruction needs to make students aware of those three worlds and the ways they interact with each other. Using the image of a box as a metaphor for the concept to be developed here, I will argue that "one cannot break out of the box," for the very simple fact that it is humanly impossible to do so. We humans are physically limited. We only have five senses, and five limited senses--we are unable to capture the same visual signals that an eagle does or the same auditory signals that a dog does, for instance. This physical limitation encapsulates us inside a box with boundaries that are set by our sensory system. Humankind has developed instruments and technologies to express and amplify the boundaries of our sensory system (Bruner, 1966). Nevertheless, in spite of our technological advancement, the sensory world--whether amplified or not--will always be "a box" within the empirical world.

The image of the box, then, represents the limited portion that the human senses are able of capturing from the unlimited empirical world. Therefore, education is not the process of helping students "to break out of the box." To establish that goal as the aim of education is equivalent to saying that teachers have the power to impart a new set of senses or change the nature of the senses that students already have. What teachers can do, however, is to help students explore their perceptual world and assist students in the process of understanding and acknowledging what is conceived by their minds. In that case, education would then be the process of "breaking into the box," not out of it.

The empirical world offers us an unlimited number of objects (matter, energy, and events [2]). Our five senses (the box we are so far destined to live in) allow us to capture only some of those objects. Our mind interprets a particular amount of those perceived objects according to the perceptual world in which it has been socialized. As a result of this process, a mismatch occurs between what our sensory system detects and what our mind construes, not only in terms of the quality and properties of the objects but also in terms of quantity. To make students aware of this fact implies a dismantling of the naïve belief that an object is an object. As Jerome Bruner (1966) points out, "[A]n object is what one does to it" (p. 12).

In sum, if a teacher is to assist students to break into their boxes, the teacher needs to set up initial conditions for students to go through the process of humanization. That implies providing students with tasks that will lead them (a) to acknowledge the existence of the three worlds described above--i.e., the empirical, the sensory, and the perceptual world; (b) to realize the mismatch existing between their sensory and their perceptual worlds; (c) to identify individual perceptions; and (d) to historicize perceptions. Only after this initial stage, characterized by realizing that an object is not an object (that, indeed, an object is approached/conceived in different ways by different individuals), students will be able to question the validity of their perceptions and the impact that their perceptions have upon the empirical world. From that standpoint, education then becomes a walk around, along, and through the box we inhabit and that we often fail to pay a visit to.

The Perceptual World

Sensations of the world and what they mean
are as much a function of the biologically fixed mechanisms
as they are of the past history of the observer.

--Robert Solso [3]

In order to develop the notion of perceptual world so that its interplay with the sensory world can be explained, this first section draws insights from the following four fields of study: (1) cognitive psychology and the concepts of sensation and perception; (2) history and the cultural conflicts that took place during the Pioneer Era; (3) feminist studies and the notion of "unmarkedness"; and (4) cultural anthropology and the myth of objectivity.

The mismatch existing between sensory and perceptual worlds is argued through the discussion on information processing. As Robert Solso (2001) examines the case of illusion, it becomes clear that human perception of "reality" is actually different from the concrete reality itself. Solso maintains that the mind distorts reality and that illusions are often caused by expectations based on past experiences. If humans, as individuals, were subject to illusion, would it then be possible to discuss "collective illusion"? Could a social group perceive "reality" quite similarly? Carlos Schwantes' (1989) interpretation of the Pioneer Era suggests that a certain perception of the empirical world can be embraced collectively and be taken for granted as the only acceptable worldview. Equally, Ruth Frankenberg (1993) illustrates the realization of that collective perception of reality in her study of whiteness, and the process of singularizing multiple perceptions. What would be the impact of having certain perceptual constructs gaining authority over others--especially upon the work of those whose profession is to inform society? James Clifford (1988) analyzes the work of ethnographers and the impossibility of being objective when studying someone else's culture. Clifford reasons that a scientist cannot translate an experience into text without subjective interference.

Assuming that those four researchers do have a point, we are left with the question of what makes it possible for a social group to consent to one view of the empirical world to take precedent over all other equally valuable views. That question will be addressed in the following section as I bring up, from philosophy, some theoretical concepts developed by Antonio Gramsci (1971) on the role of institutions of cultural exchange. In the meantime, the focus will be on the contributions coming from cognitive psychology, history, feminist theory, and cultural anthropology.

Cognitive Psychology: The Existence of Three Worlds

Solso's studies on cognitive psychology leave no doubt that humans exist within the empirical, the sensory, and the perceptual worlds. In the chapter entitled "Perception and Attention," Solso begins by establishing the difference between sensation and perception. He observes that sensation refers to the initial detection of energy from the physical world, whereas perception involves higher-order cognition in the interpretation of sensory information. The study of sensation generally deals with the structure and processes of the sensory mechanisms (the ear, the eye, and so on) and the stimuli that affect those mechanisms. The sensory system, therefore, becomes the point of contact between the individual inner world and the external reality that surrounds us--i.e., the empirical world. Even though the various elements of the sensory system function as channels that are open to external reality, not all physical phenomena are detected by our receptors. Most importantly, as Solso remarks, only the sensations that are detected by our receptors are available for higher-level processing. As a result, because the sensory system is limited in its receptivity, our knowledge of the empirical world is necessarily restricted. Consider, for instance, how our view of "reality" would change if our eyes could "see" infrared radiation but could not "see" the normally visible part of the spectrum. What a difference such change in our sensory apparatus would make on the way we organize our lives and conceive our existence.

In sum, sensation refers to the initial detection of stimuli, whereas perception implies an interpretation of the things we sense. The distinction between sensations and the perceived interpretation of sensory information has occupied a central position in cognitive studies. Cognitive psychologists aim to understand the relationships existing between physical phenomena and the way the mind organizes stimuli in internal representations. Results coming from studies on the effect between what our sensory system receives and what the mind interprets are crucial to those involved with education. For instance, studies conducted by Beal and Solso (1996) show that induced schemas have the power to influence perception and memory. Such results raise issues related to the subjective organization of perception and suggest that sensory events are processed within the context of our knowledge of the world. It is our previous experiences that give meaning to simple sensory experiences we are exposed to. In other words, studies on the relationship between the physical changes of the world and the psychological experiences associated with these changes demonstrate that the same sensory stimuli may present different psychological qualities in the mind of different individuals.

Solso also addresses the tendency of human vision to "see" things in the physical world that do not exist. These distortions are called illusions, and they are the result of the sensations from the outer world as well as of the predisposition of the visual/cognitive system in distorting what really exists in the empirical world. Beal and Solso's study also reveals that, generally, all people share those erroneous perceptions of the empirical world.

By studying the relationship between sensation and perception and the phenomenon of illusion, cognitive psychologists add to our understanding of the human perceptual process as well as its subjective organization. Those involved in the design and evaluation of school programs should not ignore the contributions made by the field of cognitive psychology. The fact that the structure of our receptors limits our sensory experience, and that the stimuli sensed are represented subjectively by the mind automatically places us within three worlds (the world beyond our senses, the one within the realm of our sensory apparatus, and the one conceived by the mind). The interplay among these worlds needs to be acknowledged and explored by curriculum theorists.

Taking-for-Grantedness: Equating the Sensory and the Perceptual Worlds

Quite often, people fail to realize that their lives are the result of the interplay among the empirical, the sensory, and the perceptual worlds. Considering that people are born within a certain social group, they inevitably conform to the main values, beliefs, customs, and concepts of the group they are part of without much critical consideration. Consequently, as one grows up, one may develop a sense of "take-for-grantedness," of perceiving the empirical and sensory worlds through one single set of concepts without considering any other alternative set. That would mean overlooking the mismatch that occurs between external physical phenomena and internal perceptual representations, as demonstrated by cognitive psychology findings.

The danger embedded in "take-for-grantedness" is the low level of tolerance and respect that individuals develop toward whatever is different from their perception. If by any chance individuals take as "natural" what has been actually "constructed," they (un)consciously reproduce and reinforce the practices that guide and give meaning to their existence. History offers us several instances in which "take-for-grantedness" had an enormous impact on the lives of those involved in the events. A classical case of erroneously equating the sensory world with the perceptual world can be illustrated through the lives of Marcus and Narcissa Whitman, who were honored on January 1, 1963, with the establishment of the Whitman Mission National Historic Site.

When narrating the Whitman massacre, Carlos Schwantes (1989) provides us with a clear example of the disastrous consequences that the "take-for-grantedness" process may have. Marcus and Narcissa Whitman were two American Board missionaries who left the East coast in 1836 and spent 207 days crossing the country in order to pursue an ideal: to start a successful mission on the other side of the Rocky Mountains. Well intentioned, the Whitmans meant to Christianize the Native-Americans and concomitantly convert them to farming. They then founded a mission station on a site called Waiilatpu, on the Walla Walla River, in the same area inhabited by the Cayuse Indians. Despite the couple's willingness to help the Indians, a chain of incidents led to a conflict between the Cayuses and the Whitmans, which resulted in the death of the missionaries and the hanging of five Cayuse leaders.

But what is much more important than memorizing names and dates related to the Pioneer Era is to understand the process that led to the event described above. The Whitmans' fate in the Pacific Northwest resulted from their taking for granted that their cultural values and practices were more valuable than those of the Cayuses,' and that the Cayuses would not question the changes the couple wanted to promote. The Whitmans lacked a critical assessment of their own cultural values, or, of their own perceptual world. They simply assumed that their interpretation of the sensory world would be the same for the Cayuses. The young missionary couple failed to acknowledge that "reality" is a subjective construct and granted themselves the authority to impose their perceptual world upon the one of the Cayuses'. For instance, the Whitmans condemned Cayuse cultural practices such as gift giving; though an essential feature of Cayuse social and political life, the Whitmans saw the practice as a form of extortion. Another mismatch between the Whitmans' and the Cayuses' perceptual worlds can be exemplified by their religious practices. For the Cayuse, religion and domestic life were closely entwined; therefore, they suggested worship service be carried out within the Whitman household. Lacking critical assessment of her own perceptions, Narcissa reacted with scorn to the Cayuse request.

Figures such as the Whitmans exemplify the agent character that all of us have. The difference among us resides only on our level of awareness concerning that character. In other words, some of us are aware of our perceptual constructs and the impact they have on the empirical/sensory worlds, while others of us are not. It is only through the historicizing of our perceptual worlds that we find out that human actions are ideologically motivated, and that we are indeed agents of a system of representations. Cognitive psychology can inform us of the differences between what is empirical, what is sensed, and what is interpreted, but it is historical studies that reveal the development of why we interpret what is sensed the way we do.

"Unmarkedness": Making the (Un)Visible Visible

The Whitman massacre illustrates our historical tendency to conceptualize our system of representations as the norm to be applied by everyone and to everyone. Not all encounters between two different perceptual worlds need to be disastrous, though. The encounter with "the different" can actually be an enriching moment. It can be a unique chance to question our values and beliefs and become conscious that our minds operate with a set of subjective constructs, also known as culture. To realize that the culture we are part of is actually only one among the many possible ways of representing and organizing the universe is to start moving away from the concept of "taking-for-grantedness."

If, in its interaction with the sensory world, humankind has developed multiple, co-existing perceptual worlds, how can one perceptual world become the point of reference which all other perceptual worlds are then subordinated to? In her study of feminism interrelated with race, Ruth Frankenberg (1993) names this process "unmarkedness." It is the process of "singularizing," that is, of taking multiplicity away through the establishment of power relationships, which results in certain constructs gaining authority over others and becoming unmarked, or the norms.

Frankenberg analyses the discourse of thirty white women whom she interviewed between the years of 1984 and 1986. Basing her studies on that series of interviews, Frankenberg shows how whiteness has shaped their lives and their positions within the social structure. Through the analysis of their language, Frankenberg traces the relationship between material reality and discourse. She compares and contrasts the interviewees' repertories, pointing out both the contradictions within their words as well as the concepts underneath their discourse. Her main objective is to make whiteness visible: to take from it the privilege of being a norm.

Another important aspect of Frankenberg's study is the way she conducted the interviews, which she calls "dialogical approach." By doing so, Frankenberg acknowledges the impossibility of the researcher to be completely neutral in his/her task. Thus, she does not hesitate in making subjectivity interferences during the interviews. Frankenberg's concept of unmarkedness elucidates how either the presence or absence of a certain concept in our mind shapes our perception of reality and reinforces, especially through discourse, the material relations that characterize society.

The Myth of Objectivity and the Naturalization of the Object

Frankenberg's choice for a dialogical approach to her interviews suggests her disbelief in objectivity. Every single step of the process of developing a study--collecting data, analyzing it, and writing the findings--is subjective. Whenever researchers develop a study, they put order, or better yet, apply their concept of "order," to empirical events that would otherwise be chaotic, multiple, ineffable. The myth of objectivity is directly related to the Western concept of science. Implied in the scientific method is the belief that a researcher can be a "neutral translator," someone who will observe the empirical world and, without any subjective interference, translate that world into text (Eisner, 2002). The very idea of translating empirical information into textual form is already a distortion of the former, for existence is not a neatly ordered set of events as the text structure implies. The potential danger of uncritically believing in the objectivity of science is the peril of "naturalizing" the results of the research. To naturalize means to make-believe it is natural, unchangeable, and therefore, the expected norm. It is to hide power relations, since one representation of the object gets more authority over the others. To allow one person's or one group's representation to be the representation of the object is to believe that the representation provided is the accurate copy of the empirical phenomenon.

James Clifford (1988) looks into the myth of objectivity and the naturalization of the object within the context of cultural anthropology. In his critique of ethnographic studies, Clifford states that, as outsiders, ethnographers cannot help being subjective when studying another culture, in the sense that they cannot avoid representing their object of study according to their own system of representations and not according to the insiders' system of representation. Even if ethnographers live among those whose culture they are interested in registering, they will never be able to "take off" their lived experience and objectively study another cultural group; nor will they be able to "put on" the cultural clothes of that group, for the group is diverse within itself. Thus, to believe that ethnography can be objective is to believe that ethnographers can leave their subjectivities back home and study culture as a close-ended object.

Like ethnography, all other fields of study are equally limited by the reasons presented so far. Culture and language, the very basics that make research possible and meaningful, is paradoxically the researcher's greatest barrier. Due to the impossibility of erasing culture and language from one's mind at the moment of research, to attribute the status of scientific to a discipline becomes questionable. If one fails to realize that "scientific studies" are actually textual accounts --partial stories based on the writers' multiple subjectivities, or representations of the fact and not the fact itself--one will give authority and power to an account that is not any more valuable than any other. So to see researchers as the purveyor of truth and the text as the compilation of that truth is an enormous mistake. Any field of study, like ethnography, is based on writing, and for that reason, it is a process of translating, in which a lot is inevitably lost, especially what cannot be captured by the discursive mode of the scientific inquiry.

Clifford argues that no matter the status of a discipline the representations embedded in that field of study need to be acknowledged as so. As Frankenberg would possibly add, our concepts, beliefs, perceptions, every single part of us has been historically, socially, politically, and culturally produced. We are a set of constructs, and so are our languages and our studies.

GOVERNANCE BY CONSENSUS

She had apprehended instinctively the dual life--
that outward existence which conforms, the inward life which
questions.

--Kate Chopin, The Awakening [4]

What is it about modern societies that despite the fact that ideologies are continuously open for discussion and contestation, they tend to remain the same? How can complex, robust structures gain the willing belief and participation of the citizenry that in its majority does not benefit from such structures? These are some of the questions that Antonio Gramsci (1971) addresses during his reflections on Marxist theory. As he attempts to explain the rise of fascism in modern west- European countries after World War I, Gramsci established the connections between social formations and hegemony. He expanded the discussion about class-consciousness beyond economic factors. By reflecting on the role of culture and instruments of ideological control, he made connections between the operations of civil society as hegemony and social formations within the parameters of the nation. In order to understand Gramsci's major contributions to the Marxist thought, the concept of State becomes crucial as well as its interaction with the civil society.

All Gramsci's discussions lead to the idea that nothing is absolutely autonomous, and in modern societies, this point of convergence that ties everything together is the State. In Gramsci's words, "State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules" (p. 244). Among the several instruments used by the State to control ideologies, Gramsci highlights the concept of "Law," which entitles the State to either reward or punish the public organism according to the rules established in and by the Law--which is itself the ideology of the State. Note that in the same way that Machiavelli does not recognize the existence of transcendent elements in society, neither does Gramsci. In that matter, the Italian philosopher agreed with Machiavelli's concept of "philosophy of praxis," in which reality results from "the concrete action of man, who, impelled by historical necessity, works and transform reality" (p. 249). Therefore, just like any other activity of society, Law is as well the product of "concrete action of man." The question is, of which man?

It is through his examination of the operation, organization and purposes of the State that Gramsci solidifies the concept of hegemony. For Gramsci, ideology serves as the engine for hegemonic control, and the concept of the State becomes the location where the ruling classes can disseminate the belief systems that enable control through consensus. Gramsci identifies institutions such as education and the court system as elements of the "initiatives and activities, which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes" (p. 258).

The willing belief and participation of the citizenry is necessary, however, for the successful maintenance of hegemonic control. Because the concept of the State itself is continually open for discussion and contestation (as shown in the different interpretations of the State by liberals, intellectuals, and other segments of society), what develops is the belief that all can significantly contribute to and shape the direction of the State. In one sense, this is proven correct by Gramsci's assertion that just as "all men are 'political beings,' all are also 'legislators'" because "every man, in as much as he is active, i.e., living, contributes to modifying the social environment in which he develops" [sic] (p. 265). The process that permits governance by consensus can be understood as follows:

The maximum of legislative capacity can be inferred when a perfect formulation of directives [i.e. laws, regulations, or moral imperatives] is matched by a perfect arrangement of the organisms of execution and verification [i.e. implementation and enforcement], and by a perfect preparation of the "spontaneous" consent of the masses who must "live" those directives, modifying their own habits, their own will, their own convictions to conform with those directives and with the objectives which they propose to achieve (p. 266).

In other words, through everyday existence and through every process of daily activity, be it work, education, consumption, social interactions, etc., every individual within a society actively contributes to shaping and reinforcing the norms and mores that perpetuate hegemonic control.

However, with the question of societal control also comes the question of how Gramsci addresses the concept of "change" within the hegemonic structure. Gramsci first defines the "purely Italian concept of 'subversive' [souversivo]" to illustrate the perpetual existence of a hierarchical political structure, where power is never equally shared among all members of society. Differentiating this definition from the English interpretation of "subversive" as a term of resistance, and combining it with the fundamental hatred of "officialdom" (or the bureaucratic element of the State) by the peasant and small farmer, Gramsci explains the difference between these traditional antagonisms and the formation of an actual "class consciousness," a form of "self-awareness via a series of negations, via their consciousness of the identity and class limits of their enemy" (pp. 272-273).

Hierarchies do produce differences, but not necessarily separations along purely economic lines, and definitely not the ones that provide for a revolutionary class-consciousness. It is this lack of self-awareness, the inability to articulate a cohesive class identity, which largely restricts "revolutionary" change, primarily because the creation of a class identity is limited by the ideological belief in "participation" which the hegemonic structure perpetuates. If one accepts the "merits" of the ruling classes as the ultimate goal, and participates in the creation of a society's achievements with the hope of one day attaining the rank of the ruling classes, then the articulation of an identity, which opposes the ruling classes on all levels of cultural existence, becomes less probable. Only when a "crisis of authority" arises, and the power of the ruling class shifts from a role of "leadership" to one of "domination and oppression" does hegemonic control break down, and the articulation of individual class identities begin--simply because the masses have become distanced from the traditional ideologies that once contributed to the perpetuation of the hegemony.

For Gramsci, however, this formulation of a powerful "counter-hegemonic" articulation does not and cannot begin and end with the economic determinism of Marx, but rather through a struggle upon the terrain of culture. Although Gramsci does not explicitly state the difficulty with this struggle, one can imply how difficult such struggle is because the terms defining the cultural norms are largely defined and influenced by the ruling classes. The struggle over those defining terms become limited as the ideology which legitimates them is reiterated through institutions of cultural exchange, such as education, family, law, etc. Gramsci's notions of hegemonic cultural norms and institutions of cultural exchanges uncover the dialectical relation between value and concepts. Take for instance the ideology of Law and the institution of the court system. The first informs what acceptable social behavior ought to be; the second defines how that acceptable behavior will be enforced and guaranteed.

CONCLUSION

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets [5]

I will now clarify the inter-relation among all the concepts discussed so far. First, the physical world that surrounds us is infinite, but the limited receptivity of our sensory system restricts our knowledge of that empirical world. Second, the sensory events that get to be detected are interpreted by our minds--which construes meaning according to our expectations and past experiences. Third, our expectations and past experiences get shaped through socialization, which introduces us to and reminds us of the cultural norms of the social groups we participate in. Fourth, cultural norms are the set of subjective constructs that function as collective internal representations of the physical world, and they result from concrete human action. The concluding thought is, therefore, whoever owns the constructs that comprise culture, ultimately induces the group's perceptual world, such as the theoretical and practical definition of knowledge. For a counter-hegemonic action to take place, it is necessary to redefine the core cultural constructs that guide the group's practical and theoretical activities. It means to struggle over defining terms through the institutions of cultural exchange.

The theoretical perspective proposed above suggests that the final intent of education is not to develop un-ideological, un-biased persons, but individuals able to acknowledge, identify, historicize and evaluate their systems of representation. One cannot break out of the box, because one cannot exist completely free from world affiliations. Nevertheless, what one can surely do is to break into the box and explore how personal beliefs and participation in belief systems interplay with the material world that surrounds us. For that journey to take place, education turns out to be a key institution of cultural exchange. Assuming that the three worlds described initially do exist, and that they are characterized by continuous, intense, dynamic interplay, then that makes us, humans, and a quite active portion of that system. The materials relations we currently establish can actually be modified if we, collectively, dare to explore our perceptual world.

END NOTES

1. Quoted in Solso, 2001, p. 74.
2. Events are defined here as the interplay between matter and energy.
3. Solso, 2001, p. 80.
4. Events are defined here as the interplay between matter and energy.
5. Eliot, 1952, p. 145.

REFERENCES

Beal, M. K. & Solso, R. L. (1996).

Schematic Activation and the Viewing of Pictures. Paper presented at the Western Psychological Association, San Jose, CA.

 

Bruner, J. S. (1966).

Toward a Theory of Instruction. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

 

Clifford, J. (1988).

The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.

 

Eisner, W. E. (2002).

The Educational Imagination: On the Design and Evaluation of School Programs. 3rd ed. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Prentice Hall.

 

Eliot, T. S. (1971).

The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

 

Frankenberg, R. (1993).

White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

 

Gramsci, A. (1971).

Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith. New York: International Publishers.

 

McMahan, E., Day S., & Funk, R. (Eds.). (1993).

Nine Short Novels by American Women. New York: St. Martin's Press.

 

Schwantes, C. A. (1989).

The Pacific Northwest: An Interpretive History. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

 

Solso, R. L. (2001).

Cognitive Psychology. 6th ed. Needham Height, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Academic Exchange Extra invites reader responses to any writings in this issue--especially articles advancing the scholarly debate of issues raised.

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